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I cherish this opportunity of greeting the members of the Law School's entering class, and of
adding to the welcome already extended by Dean
Neal and other members of the Law faculty in
the course of class sessions of the last few days.
My colleagues and I wish for the members of this
class the provocative intellectual experience the
study of law can bring - and which I anticipate
you will have - and then, beyond that, the gaining of that knowledge, understanding and service
a life in the law makes possible. Classes have begun. The punditry of faculty - an extraordinary
group - is on display. The brightness of classmates shines. The swift transition from layman
to professional is on its way. But it is not too late
for the members of the class to remember how it
was before they became lawyers. You still know
how it was to look at the law from the outside;
you are still in the throes, despite what special
experiences you might have had, of realizing that
first perception of how law looks on the inside.
This is a favorable position, but one of disequilibrium. In future years, and in but a brief
period, your problem will be how to regain these
insights, and how to use them to illuminate the
special knowledge and craftsmanship which law
requires.
Law does not exist for or by itself. It operates
for and with people, and in a society which, perhaps particularly in the United States, is not
homogenous. It uses the tools of the intellect, and
the insight and craftsmanship required for an art.
Even as you are fully absorbed, as you must be,
in the acquisition and perfection of skills, and as
you gain for yourself, as you should, an organizing
'This paper was presented by Edward H. Levi, President of The
University and Professor of Law, to the entering Class of 1976
on October 2. 1974.
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view of the sovereign control of the ends of the
law, it is important to remember that law is not
everything. In more or less degree this is the
advice which should be given for all specialized
study. Each major intellectual discipline seeks
for itself a major dominating monopoly view of
the world. But economics is not everything, nor
are psychiatry, psychology or sociology. And not
even public relations. Even in the natural sciences it is the preclusive boundaries which must
be pierced, not only to give renewed vitality to
the disciplines, so that questions and inquiry may
find their own way, but also as a reminder that
enclosed structures give an imperfect view, and
that while knowledge is interrelated, the kinds
of knowledge appropriate for different tasks and
perception vary with what must be done.
There are special reasons for emphasizing this
with respect to law. Law builds upon and, I
should like to claim, is one of the liberal arts.
It uses words of persuasion and changing definition for practical ends. It has absorbed within
itself a view of the nature of human beings, and
of how their acts and the incidents which overtake them may be classified for favor or penalty,
or for rights, permission or negation. Law, itself,
is a mediating discipline, not only among the
passions and needs of human beings, sometimes
viewed severally and sometimes in groups or associations, but with respect to the craftsmanship
which is useful, and to the relevance of what is
perceived as current knowledge or opinion. As
an instrument for practical action, law is responsive to the wisdom of its time, which may be
wrong, but it carries forward, sometimes in opposition to this wisdom or passion, a memory of
received values.
Thus, I should like to emphasize, you bring
much to the study of law, and difficult as it may
be, you should try to preserve this larger view.
And you should remember there is no such thing
as having had a liberal education. To have
worked in the liberal arts gains meaning only as
the work is continued. I hope you will continue
that work here and beyond. For a thoughtful
4

lawyer -

for a thoughtful citizen - education is

always lost if it is not renewed.
A part, but only a part of what I am trying to
say, is exemplified in the advice which a young
American future statesman gave to his friend,
William Bradford, to urge him to study law. The
year was 1773. The young American wrote: "If
I am to speak my sentiments of Merchandise,
Physics and Law I must say they are all honorable
and useful professions and think you ought to
have more regard to their suitableness to your
genius than to their comparative Excellence. As
far as I know your endowments I should pronounce Law the most eligible .

.

. It alone can

bring into use many parts of your knowledge you
have acquired and will still have a taste for, and
pay you for cultivating the Arts of Eloquence.
It is a sort of General Lover that woos all the
Muses and Graces."
A sort of General Lover that woos all the
Muses and Graces Karl Llewellyn did not shrink
from calling lawyering - in school and in practice - "trade, culture and profession all in one."
Speaking of the materials of the law, he said,
"I say in these things there is poetry, in these
things there is life, in these things there is beauty.
If this be not culture, I do not know where to
find it." He did not say these things would come
easily. He remarked, "Within a hair we have lost
the art of reading." And he was right. There was
a reason Llewellyn called his lecture, which you
should read, The Bramble Bush.
Candor compels me to add to the account of
the relationship between Bradford and his advising young friend. Bradford followed the advice and commenced the study of law. Several
months later the young friend began, through a
course of reading, to study law himself. This
particular kind of exposure - and I do not give
this as a warning - seems to have produced a different reaction within him. He wrote Bradford:
"I was afraid you would not easily have loosened
your affections from the Belles Lettres. A delicate
taste and warm imagination like yours must find
it hard to give up such refined and exquisite en5

joyments for the coarse and dry study of the Law.
It is like leaving a pleasant flourishing field for a
barren desert; perhaps I should not say barren
either because the Law does bear fruit but it is
sour fruit that must be gathered and pressed and
distilled before it can bring pleasure or profit."
To this Bradford responded, "Some parts of
the law are indeed dry and disagreeable enough,
but you should not call it a barren study. Far
from it. It bears golden fruit, my friend. Rather
say the Belles Lettres are unprofitable." And then
he repeated, slightly incorrectly, a couplet from
Samuel Butler:
"For what's the worth of
anything
But as much money as
'twill bring."
And he commented that, "It is this that attracts
so many to engage in the profession and that
makes them pore over the dry pages of Littleton
and Coke with more pleasure than those of
Homer or Cicero."
You will be glad to know that ten years later
we find the young adviser renewing his reading
in law. While not a practicing lawyer, he was a
powerful influence in the shaping of the law of
our country and in the codification and revision
of the law of his state. His name was James
Madison. William Bradford, I believe, became
Attorney General of the United States.
Let me return from this glimpse of gold, which
sometimes, but not always accompanies social
justice, to mention briefly three aspects of the
relationship of law to other disciplines and institutions of society, and to behavioral patterns.
To do this, I will pass quickly over an ancient,
but changing and sporadically active, controversy
concerning the nature and sources of law, and I
will move to what is perhaps a slight variation of
a present predominant view.
At the heart of legal systems, as we know them,
are rules normally accepted as obligatory, and
the availability of sanctions or authenticating
steps which may be imposed. A variety of or.
ganizations as well as active social customs have
6

these characteristics. When Mr. Kimpton was
Chancellor of the University, he was invited to
dinner at Burton-Judson. The Master of BurtonJudson requested that the male students wear
suit coats for the occasion. They did so, but left
off their trousers. I assume there are some institutions in which trousers could be required.
We might add as even more important attributes for the formal legal system (possibly assumed or inchoate in the two I have already
stated), institutions or accepted ways for rule
creation, interpretation and enforcement. Again,
many social institutions have these attributes.
Thus, life within the family, social, economic and
religious enterprises might be included. To these
requirements we might further join an insistence
that definite procedures be followed, arising out
of the conceptions created by the system itself, to
enforce minimum standards of participation or
representation and fairness. There is a temptation to think of the adversary system as merely a
civilized adaptation of self-help or the feud, but
obviously it is a great deal more.
It may be said that this recital of attributes,
which at one time might have invited a belief
that they marked the evolution of a legal system
to maturity (I do not believe it is that simple),
is flawed because it does not include the state as
the moving power or authenticating force. I have
left the state out to emphasize that if the state or
government or sovereignty is decisive in our
recognition of what is a system of law, we should
realize that government action may be direct or
quite remote, and only tangentially related. It
may be implied or demanded, and thus bestowed
after the fact, because the other attributes of law,
or some of them, are present. The government,
indeed, may insist, or others will insist, that if
important rules are normally accepted as obligatory, these must be under the jurisdiction of the
formal legal system. And yet if it is important
to put the government in, it is also a mistake, as
I suppose we have reason to know, to assume that
everything the government does is equivalent to
law or the legal system.
7

The first aspect of this relationship of law to
other institutions of society or behavioral patterns, then, is to press upon you again that law
is not everything, but it is a great deal, and sometimes it is too much. There is no evading this
problem. It is a problem many generations of
lawyers will have to meet. There, undoubtedly,
are a variety of answers. But we must recognize
that law is a powerful and frequently, perforce,
crude instrument with which to regulate all human conduct. In modern western society, law
brings with it an increasing paraphernalia of
structure, a public aspect, a determination - not
always realized - to seek finality, an assumption
that what has been done in one area should be
done in another, a harshness, and an inevitable
influence toward conformity. The quaint - to
our eyes - older writing as to the sources of the
law reminds us that the increased communication
and centralization of our time have changed
the quality of the law, and this must be taken
into account.
There have been and are societies, China, for
example, which are of ancient lineage and have
developed so that vast areas of human conduct
are controlled by social pressures outside of what
we would call the formal legal system. To such
a lesser degree as, of course, to mark a difference
in kind, this is also true in the United States, although those areas where law is not intricately
involved are diminishing. The example of China
is appropriate because it reminds us that non-law
systems can be authoritarian, and we like to believe, and there is truth in this, that the thrust
of our legal system is for the protection of the
individual. Yet it is a peculiar but natural arrogance, and I beg of you to think hard on this
point, to believe that it is the system of law - one
institution among many - which is always the
best protector of human freedom. If we are to
woo all the Muses and Graces, let Humility be
among them. We still carry with us the thought
that liberty is aided or protected if there are
areas "which are not the law's business." This
phrase was the focus of an important debate be8

tween Lord Devlin and Professor H. L. A. Hart
of Oxford, beginning about fifteen years ago.
One of the notable addresses in that debate was
given by Lord Devlin as the Ernst Freund Lecture ten years ago in this hall. The debate concerned the use of the criminal law to enforce
morality, but the implications of that debate are
broader. Of course the removal of matters of
personal morality from the grasp of law is probably the easiest area in which to win approval
from those who favor the extension of law for
social action - and the reverse is probably sometimes true also. But I suggest the effects of intervention in a variety of areas need to be appraised
and not taken for granted. Moreover, as our law
develops, this is not necessarily a matter for public debate, but flows from accretions of constitutional interpretations, and further rides on the
point that law is already present in the area and
must be clothed with all its attributes.
Because I do not wish to be misunderstood, let
me say explicitly that I think it is an urgent
matter for governance and law to make effective
a new or renewed charter of freedom for all
citizens. But the challenge to statecraft is to
achieve this with a minimum, not a maximum,
of the structure of formal law.
The second aspect of the relationship between
law and other institutions of society and to be.
havioral patterns is based on the unique characteristics and responsibilities which law carries.
Thus, while it is important

-

and particularly

for a lawyer - to observe the similarities in group
behavior in the many areas of life where there
are collective causes, there is a point in insisting
that law is or ought to be different. There is a
paradox in this, I realize. It is because law is seen
as everywhere that the distinction between it and
other activities is blurred. One can, of course,
analyze society naively as though nothing more
were involved than a series of pressure groups
and devices. Roscoe Pound, who began his important work in the jurisprudence of interests
at this University, powerfully influenced at that
time by the work in sociology, saw the task of law
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as social engineering, mediating and responding
to the various claims of society. But it is a far
different conception which treats law as only
another device for social pressure and leverage.
The special responsibility for law is that its end
is the common good. The values which it exemplifies in its treatment of individuals and
groups must be conditioned to that end. Law
does invoke sanctions which penetrate deeply and
can be terrifying in their impact. The misuse of
law as but another device for leverage is profoundly corrupting. Unfortunately we have many
examples of this in our time. One would hope
that the emergence of the lawyer as more than a
scrivener or a clerk, and his acceptance as an
officer of the court, would mean more than the
duty to protect orderly procedures in that forum.
Indeed, it has meant more. But to accomplish
this, the profession carries an accountability to
the system of justice it protects, and a duty to
improve that system. If so, there really is a great
deal for you to do.
I come now to the third aspect which deals
more particularly with the relationship of law to
other disciplines. You note I reject a view of law
as being solely what a judge, as a judge, says it is.
Such a view makes a valuable point, but it is
seriously wrong. The judge may have the last
word, even though sometimes for only a brief
period. But one might as well say that for many
matters and substantial periods, the law is what
the practicing lawyer or commentator says or, in
other areas, what the policeman does. Moreover,
there is legislation; there are executive orders, ad.
ministrative rules. There is obviously much more
to law than the report of cases. And even if we
tried to limit law to what the cases say, the social
theories of the particular time will find their
expression there. Witness the attention which has
been paid to the so-called sociological footnote in
Brown v. Board of Education, and before that to
the reference to the Brandeis brief in Muller v.
Oregon, considered enlightened for its time, and
eloquent on the point that it is appropriate to
restrict or qualify the conditions under which
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women should be permitted to work.
Law is part of both the humanities and the
social sciences. I suppose it could be argued that
it should be studied as they are studied. The
idiosyncrasy of law study, doubtedly, is in part
an accident of history.
When the legal profession developed in England in the thirteenth century, the universities of
Europe (as, for example, at Bologna), which regarded law as a major intellectual discipline, were
preoccupied with Roman and canon law. The
materials for the study of the common law were
mainly customary practices and writs. We know,
of course, that Bracton collected a large number
of case results, but the reporting of cases was
sparse. So the education of the new profession
was mainly, as Pollock and Maitland described it,
"purely empirical" - a phrase which would have
a somewhat different meaning today. If one
jumps to the eighteenth and a good part of the
nineteenth century in the United States, the
apprenticeship system still predominates. The
printing press has made reading law an actuality.
You will recall Bradford's reference to Coke and
Littleton. A few notable professorships are established. Lectures are widely distributed. So the
American edition of Sir William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England becomes
a legal bible for many American lawyers and students. The writings of Chitty, James Wilson,
Chancellor Kent and Justice Story supplemented
the work in law offices, in a few proprietary
schools, and in the beginning university programs.
When Holmes went to the Harvard Law School
in 1864, this was just six years before the transition to the case method. There were three professors. The two-year curriculum was composed
of lectures, moot court and a reading list of
treatises. Holmes left the program in the middle
of the second year and finished in a law office.
While he often said pleasant things about his
legal education, he did describe it as presenting
law as a "ragbag of details." He commented that
"the best training is found in our moot courts
and in the offices of older lawyers;" a journal of
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which he was co-editor a few years later complained "the condition of the Harvard Law
School has been almost a disgrace to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." Holmes was hard
to please. When a few years later Langdell introduced the case method to Harvard, Holmes,
in an unsigned review of Langdell's casebook,
commented, "Decisions are reconciled which
those who gave them meant to be opposed, and
drawn together by subtle lines which never were
dreamed of before Mr. Langdell wrote." He labeled Langdell as "the greatest legal theologian"
not intended, I think, to be a compliment. Years
later, Jerome Frank, a product of this Law School,
spearheaded the realist attack on the training of
law students solely through the reading of cases,
dismissing Langdell as a bookish man. But the
case method continued to win out, even though
now it is much changed and supplemented, not
because law is to be studied as analytical chemistry was then viewed, as Eliot and Langdell
seemed to think, but because law is humanistic,
seeks to apply continuity to values and determinations, and requires the testing of Socratic
discussions.
There has been an extraordinary growth in the
social sciences, and surely law can be studied as a
social phenomenon. Special aspects or problems
can be looked at: the operations of the court
system, itself; the importance of guilty pleas or
particular rules of evidence on some quantitative
basis; the effect of evidentiary rules on police
conduct; alternatives to ways of improving the
penitentiary system. The list is long. But beyond these matters directly related to the legal
system, itself, much modern social science research
cannot help but have implications which may
question the assumed results following from legal
rules or the given reasons for the rules. Law is
pervasive throughout most of human life. In his
most famous speech on legal education, Holmes
said, "The rational study of law is still to a large
extent the study of history. History must be part
of the study because without it we cannot know
the precise rules which it is our business to know.
12

it is part of the rational study, because it is the
first step toward an enlightened scepticism." And
then he went on to say, "the man of the future is
the man of statistics and the master of economics."
I assume he meant these specific subjects, but he
also meant them to signify the growing substance
and techniques of the social sciences. And I also
suppose he meant you.
If law is a mediating discipline with respect
to the craftsmanship which is useful and to the
relevance of what is perceived as current knowledge or opinion, then it is important that the
higher learning in law search out those techniques and theories of knowledge most relevant
to the correction or direction of law. This Law
School has been one of the leaders in this research, not only in the relationship of law to
other disciplines, but, as I think is necessary when
such research is done, in the other disciplines
directly. The point of this is that one cannot
simply take the stated conclusions of another science and apply them. At some stage of the interrelationship, the question of law has to be reformulated, but the assumed impact and meaning
of the external theory must also be reexamined.
This is when the research really begins. This is
the beginning of understanding.
Law is its own discipline, not to be captured
by any other. It must keep fresh its relationships
to other fields of knowledge, and to the enlightened as well as the common thought of its time.
But there is an integrity and a cohesiveness of its
own which must be maintained. Law has its own
history which is part of its working process, the
values it protects, the procedures which have
been developed for change. It is a discipline to
be studied. But it is much more. The problem
for the lawyer, and for the legal scholar, is not
just to know the law, but how to create within it.
It is a world of artistry and craftsmanship and
change.
I do not know that the law will bring you gold,
but in its own terms - and the terms are important - it will be rewarding.
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